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Abstract
Public sector restructuring,  including labor downsizing,  added per worker is similar in both cases,  state-owned
has been  one of the  main areas  of policy  activism in  enterprises  experience  an increase in total value added,
developing countries  and transition  economies.  But little  and in value added per unit of capital, whereas both
is known about its actual effects.  Rama and Newman use  indicators decline  in private  enterprises.  The difference,
panel data on  Colombian enterprises  spanning more than  which  could simply reflect the larger extent of initial
one decade to  assess the impact on several productivity  inefficiency  in state-owned  enterprises,  does not appear
indicators.  The results suggest that the productivity gains  to depend on the degree of competition in product
from downsizing are  larger in state-owned  enterprises  markets.
than in private  enterprises. While the increase in value
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Can state-owned enterprises be made more efficient?  Many would argue that this is a
hopeless endeavor in developing countries and transition economies. In their view, political
considerations and insider power will always prevail. As a result, overstaffing, an inadequate
skill mix, and ineffective work practices are unavoidable. From this perspective, the only
prospect to increase the productivity of state-owned enterprises is to transfer them to the private
sector. For others, however, the key to higher productivity is not ownership,  but rather a
competitive  environment.  Public sector restructuring would thus yield some promise if it were
accompanied by increased competition in product markets and a harder budget constraint.
Regardless of the merits of these two views, it is clear that privatization is not always an
option, at least not in the short run. Governments  often want to retain control over industries
that are allegedly "strategic."  They can also be reluctant to divest because of the threat of
political resistance by vocal stakeholders, including trade unions. Regulatory weaknesses and
the potential for corruption and asset stripping in the privatization process may be powerful
deterrents too. And even when governments are committed to divest, some restructuring may
be needed in preparation for privatization.  In many cases, dealing with labor redundancies is
seen as prerequisite  to attract private investors.
The restructuring of state-owned enterprises has been an important area of policy
activism in developing countries and transition economies.  This restructuring has often
involved substantial employment cuts. In 1991-93  alone, Haltiwanger  and Singh (1999)
1identified 41 World Bank loans and credits indirectly supporting public sector downsizing
operations in client countries. Of them,  15 were aimed at restructuring  or privatizing state-
owned enterprises.  By a conservative  estimate, a similar number of downsizing operations was
supported by the World Bank during the rest of the  1990s. A World Bank memorandum issued
in 1996 paved the way for the direct funding of separation packages  for redundant workers,  as
opposed to the indirect support of the early 1990s, which was channeled through the
government's  budget. The 1996 memorandum justified lending for separation packages if the
case could be made that labor downsizing would increase productivity.
However, measuring the productivity impact of enterprise restructuring in general, and of
labor downsizing in particular,  is not an easy task. In the private sector, the cheerful response of
stock markets to restructuring or downsizing announcements suggest that this impact is
positive. But it would be hazardous to assume that it is positive in the public sector as well. If
political pressures and insider power lead to "wrong" recruitment decisions, they could also
lead to "wrong" downsizing decisions (Rama 1999).
There are not many empirical  studies on the productivity impact of downsizing, and most
of them refer to the private sector. The pioneering paper in this literature, by Baily, Bartelsman,
and Haltiwanger (1996), refers to manufacturing in the United States.  It shows that plants that
increased  employment contributed  as much to overall productivity growth as plants that
reduced employment.  Similar conclusions  are reached by Lach (1999) for the manufacturing
sector of Israel. Studies relying on more focused samples identify stronger effects.  In a paper
examining the performance of 118 U.S. firms, Espahbodi, John, and Vasudevan  (2000) find
that operating performance improves significantly following downsizing.  Something similar
happens  in motor vehicle manufacturing  in the United Kingdom,  according to a study by
Collins and Harris (1999). However,  this study also finds that "unsuccessful"  downsizers tend
to have among the worst productivity growth rates.
The evidence is even thinner concerning downsizing in the public sector. In a study
dealing with 281  privatization episodes in Mexico, La Porta and L6pez-de-Silanes  (1999)
found that downsizing efforts prior to privatization did raise privatization prices, suggesting
that the productivity impact was positive. But the estimated effect was barely significant.
Another paper by Sheehan, Morris, and Hassard (2000), more descriptive in nature, dealt with
redundancies in Chinese state-owned  enterprises.  It found that the potential political
repercussions of  job losses hindered the freedom of management to adjust employment levels
in the interest of efficiency, which suggests that downsizing could increase productivity. But
this is a conjecture.Another line of research has emphasized the impact of competitive pressures on public
sector productivity.  State-owned enterprises would not be able to keep outdated work practices,
or poor monitoring, if  their survival was at stake. Inefficiencies of this sort could only last in
enterprises that enjoy some monopoly power,  or are subject to a soft budget constraint. While
many state-owned  enterprises  are sheltered from competitive forces, those that are not should
exhibit productivity levels that are close to those of the private sector, despite being state
owned. Bartel and Harrison (2000) provide some evidence  supporting this view in the case of
Indonesia. Based on their findings, it would be tempting to conclude that public sector
downsizing could increase productivity if it were to take place in a competitive environment.
But again, this is a conjecture.
In the absence of more systematic results, estimates of the impact of labor downsizing on
public sector productivity usually rely on more or less arbitrary assumptions.  One common,
extreme assumption, is that the marginal productivity of all separated  workers is zero. At the
other extreme,  it can be assumed that state-owned  enterprises operate on their technological
frontier, their only source of inefficiency being the excessive number of workers per unit of
capital. In this case, the marginal productivity of redundant workers would be lower than their
marginal cost to the enterprise, but it would still be positive.
Assumptions of this sort cover too broad a range to provide reliable estimates.  In an
assessment of public sector downsizing in Algeria, Ruppert (1999) showed that the economic
returns to labor downsizing  could vary from strongly positive in one extreme case to strongly
negative in the other one, hence the need for more accurate estimates.
This paper exploits a unique plant-level data set to estimate the actual impact of labor
downsizing on public sector productivity in a developing country, namely Colombia.  This data
set, which includes almost 80,000 observations,  has a panel structure and spans more than a
decade (1977-1991). Over that period, Colombia experienced sustained economic growth but
did not embark in a privatization program. Many enterprises undertook a restructuring of their
activities, sometimes involving substantial  employment cuts. The extent and persistence of
these cuts is used in the paper to identify several hundred downsizing episodes, many of which
affected  state-owned enterprises.  Taking advantage of the panel nature of the data set, the paper
then estimates the impact of downsizing on several productivity indicators.  This impact is
systematically compared across privately- and state-owned enterprises,  taking into account the
extent of competition in product markets.
32.  The Analytical  Framework
Most studies on the impact of restructuring on productivity focus on the entry and exit of
enterprises or plants. This turnover process is often labeled "external" restructuring, as opposed
to the "internal" restructuring that takes place in continuing enterprises. Productivity  gains from
"internal" restructuring are often computed as a residual, much the same as total factor
productivity gains in macroeconomic  growth accounting. "Internal" restructuring is thus treated
as a continuous process, rather than as a discrete  change. Decompositions of productivity
growth along these lines can be found in the studies by Davis, Haltiwanger,  and Schuh (1996)
for the United States, and by Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2000) for the United Kingdom.  A
similar approach is applied in the studies collected by Roberts and Tybout (1996) to a series of
developing countries, including Colombia.
The approach in this paper, on the other hand, identifies restructuring  efforts based on
changes in employment  at the plant level. This approach has some similarity with the one
applied by Baily, Bartelsman,  and Haltiwanger (1996)  to the analysis of productivity in U.S.
manufacturing.  Baily and others compare plants whose employment  level increases to plants
whose employment level decreases between  1977 and 1987. The former are identified as
"downsizers" and the latter as "upsizers."  However, minor changes in employment over a
decade may not reflect any major restructuring effort. This is why our paper relies on a critical
downsizing threshold. Only plants whose employment reduction exceeds this threshold in any
given year, and is at least partially sustained during the following year, are considered
downsizers.
The focus on employment cuts that are not only large, but also sustained, is warranted to
deal with measurement error bias. Productivity is often measured in units of output (say, value
added) per worker. But employment  is measured imperfectly.  Consider the case where the
number of workers reported for a specific plant in a specific  year falls below the actual level.
For instance, one digit could be missing in the reported data. Assume also that value added is
correctly measured.  This plant could be considered a downsizer, and it would also appear to
experience a substantial increase in value added per worker.  However, measurement error is
presumably uncorrelated over time (missing digits are more or less randomly distributed in the
sample). If  this is so, the apparent reduction in employment would not be sustained over time,
and the plant should not be considered as a downsizer.
The potential effects of downsizing  oil productivity are illustrated by Figure 1. The bold
solid line in this figure is a standard production  function, linking the labor input L to the output
level Y for a given capital stock K0. The initial equilibrium, represented by point A, is one
where the enterprise is overstaffed.  At the prevailing wage level w, profits are maximized when
4employment is equal to LI.  In graphical terms, the optimum for the enterprise is represented by
point B, where the marginal productivity of labor is equal to its cost. Moving from A to B
entails a reduction in total output (from Yo to YI). If the capital stock remains unchanged, there
is also a proportionate decline in output per unit of capital. But output per worker increases.
This is reflected in the steeper slope of OB,  compared to OA.
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remains unchanged, whereas actual restructuring efforts may also involve discarding outdated
equipment, or introducing new technologies.  Consider the simplest example,  where an obsolete
line of production is shut down. In this example, the reduction in employment is associated
with a reduction in the capital stock from Ko to KI. Because of the smaller capital  stock, the
production function shifl downwards,  as reflected by the bold broken line in Figure 1. The new
equilibrium could be represented by a point like B'. Because of the smaller capital  stock, the
optimal employment level is lower than in the previous example,  and the decline in total output
is larger. The increase in output per worker can be either larger or smaller depending on
technology.  Figure 1 corresponds to the case where output per worker is the same in B and B'.
The second qualification refers to the nature of the initial inefficiency.  In point A, the
enterprise is overstaffed but makes the best possible use of its personnel. Point A lies on the
production function indeed. However, the initial situation could be one where the enterprise is
not only overstaffed, but also fails to exploit its technological possibilities, as in point A'. By
shedding its excess labor, and reorganizing production so as to take full advantage  of its
resources, the enterprise could move from point A' to point B. This move could be associated
with an increase  in total output (from Zo to YI), and a corresponding increase in output per unit
of capital.  There would also be a substantial increase in output per worker, because productivity
in the initial equilibrium was abnormally low (the line OA' was flatter than the line OA).
The discussion in the previous paragraphs has implications  for the measurement  of
productivity gains. Many studies focus on total factor productivity growth, i.e., on the change
in output that is not accounted for by changes in capital and labor inputs. But this calculation
requires that all changes be measured in comparable units.  Typically,  changes in inputs are
multiplied by indicators of their marginal productivity. Thus, for instance, the change in
employrnent is multiplied by the average labor cost per worker. However,  this approach
implicitly assumes that resources are been used efficiently, which is inconsistent with the need
for restructuring. Point A in Figure 1 is characterized by a marginal productivity of labor below
the labor cost w. And the gap is even larger in point A'. Under these circumstances,  attaching
weights to the changes in capital and labor inputs involves some arbitrariness.
Rather than trying to compute total factor productivity,  this paper relies on the three
indicators considered in the discussion of Figure 1. These are total output (Y), output per unit
of labor (Y/L),  and output per unit of capital (Y/K). Enterprise restructuring in general, and
labor downsizing in particular, may lead to changes in all three. Using lowercase letters for
logs, productivity gains in plant "i" and year "t" can be defined as follows:
6dy.  = Log Yi,t  - Log Yi,t-l  (1)
d(y/l)l,t  (LogY.t  -LogY.  - (Log L.  -Log.  L  1 )  (2)
d(  )i,  t  Log Y.,t  Log Y.,  -1  L-otgKi t  Log Kit1  (3)
By construction,  these three indicators are expressed in relative terms. For relatively
small values they can be interpreted  as percentages.
The paper compares productivity changes across plants, after classifying them along two
dimensions:  state owned versus privately owned, and downsizers versus nondownsizers. The
simplest analyses describe the distribution of dy, d(y/l) and d(y/k) in each of the four groups
resulting from this two-dimensional  classification.  More elaborate analyses control for other
characteristics of the plants, such as their initial "size," the taxes and subsidies they are subject
to, their sector of activity, or the province they are located in. These variables,  as well as the
year considered,  are summarized by the vector X1,t.  Other important variables refer to the
degree of competition in product markets,  identified as Mi,t.
The basic specification used in the econometric  analysis has the following forn:
dy,t  = a  + al  Si + a2 D  It  +a3 SI Dit  + aX Xi,t  aM  i,t  i,t
In this equation,  Si is a dummy variable equal to one if enterprise "i" is owned by the
state, whereas Di,t is a dummy variable equal to one if enterprise  "i" downsizes its workforce in
year "t." The default case corresponds to a privately owned enterprise that does not downsize.
Parameter al measures the gap in productivity growth rates between state owned and privately
owned enterprises in the absence of any downsizing. Parameter  a2 reflects the impact of
downsizing on the productivity of privately owned enterprises,  whereas parameter  a3  assesses
whether this impact  is different in the public and the private sectors.
Similar equations can be estimated replacing the explained variable dy by d(y/l), or by
d(y/k). However,  not all the variables in vector X can be retained in these other equations. This
is because a spurious correlation  could emerge between plant "size" indicators and productivity
indicators. Plant size can be measured by Log Ki,tI and Log Li,t  . But the latter variable is used
to compute d(y/l) (see equation 2), whereas the former is used to calculate d(y/k) (see equation
73). In the presence of measurement  error, having the same variable in the left-hand  side and the
right-hand side of the equation can bias the estimates.  Consequently  Log K,-1l is dropped from
vector X when the left-hand side variable is d(y/k), whereas Log Li,t-l is dropped when the left-
hand side variable is d(y/l).
A shortcoming of the specification in equation (4) is to ignore the potential impact of
unmeasured plant characteristics  on productivity growth. A common finding across studies is
the importance of idiosyncratic  factors in explaining differences  in productivity across plants. If
those idiosyncratic factors were correlated with any of the explanatory variables,  estimating
equation (4) by ordinary least squares would yield biased results. The availability of panel data
makes it possible to overcome this problem, by letting the constant term in equation (4) be
plant specific. This is the same as introducing a dummy variable for each enterprise. The
drawback of the panel data approach  is that parameter al cannot be estimated anymore. This is
because the dummy variable Si is the sum of all the dummy variables for state-owned
enterprises, so that there is perfect colinearity.
The specification used to exploit the panel nature of the data is the following:
dyt  D=,t  83 S, Di,t + 8X Xi t +IJM Mi t + Vi t  (5)
This equation can be estimated using fixed effects. Again, similar equations can be
estimated for d(y/l) and d(y/k), dropping from vector X the "size" indicators Log Lt-l and Log
Kt-I  respectively.
Finally, the paper also assesses whether a competitive  environment affects the impact of
downsizing on productivity. This is achieved by interacting the market characteristics M with
the dummy variables  S and D. Equation (4) can thus be rewritten as:
dy.  =a  ±a S.+a  D.  +ia  S.D.  +a  X.  +a  M.  +  (6) i, t  O  1 Si +2  i t  3 Si Di t +  XXi t + aMM  +  6
4  i Mi t  5 D  ,t  3i  t  6  i  i,t  i, t  i, t
whereas equation (5) becomes:
8dy  i t  =  Oi +42  D  t +183 SiDi t +8XXi  t +  1 Mi t +  (7)
+4  S.M.  +fl  D.  M.  +t  S. D  M.  +v  4 1  1,  5  I,t  l,t  6  O  ,  s  ,
The key parameters to assess the impact of product market competition on the
productivity gains from restructuring are a4 to a 6 and  114  to  16
3.  The Manufacturing Sector in Colombia
Colombia is one of the few developing countries where the data needed to estimate
equations (4) to (7) are available. The original source of these data is the census of
manufacturing plants conducted by the Departamento  Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica
(DANES). The census reports information on dozens of state-owned enterprises. Mark J.
Roberts  and James R. Tybout transformed the individual cross-section  data sets into a panel, by
matching plant records across survey rounds for  1977 to 1991.  The matching was based on
stable characteristics of  firms,  such as their initial year of operation and their location.  It also
involved information on inventories at the beginning and the end of the year (see Roberts
1996). As a result, between 87 and 92 percent of all enterprises were matched in any given
year.
During the period covered by the data, the manufacturing  sector enjoyed a stable
macroeconomic  environment and moderate growth. Unlike other Latin American countries,
Colombia did not experience  high levels of inflation or serious aggregate imbalances,  and was
not forced to implement fiscal reforms.  Its approach to macroeconomic policy was gradualist
and fiscally conservative,  in accordance with the country's tradition. Public expenditures grew
during the  1980s, but the level of taxation grew sufficiently to cover the growth in public
expenditures.  Public sector debt was relatively small, and average deficits were estimated as
being only 1.5 percent of GDP (Carrasquilla  1996,  and Galat 1998).
Microeconomic  policies were relatively stable too. Trade policy went from a period of
liberalization  in the late 1970s to a protectionist period through most of the 1  980s. The late
1970s witnessed a series of reductions in quantitative restrictions  and nominal tariffs. But many
of the restrictions were reintroduced in 1981 when a declining real exchange rate hurt exports
and led to pressure to protect the import-competing  domestic market. Export promotion stayed
at levels that had been introduced in 1967 (Roberts 1996), so trade policy was focused on the
import side. More significant trade liberalization did not occur until the early 1  990s.
9The size and scope of the public sector was diverse, including large industry and finance.
The largest nonfinancial components were the nation's social security system, the state-owned
petroleum company,  the electricity and telecommunication sectors,  the state-owned coal
company,  a large public transportation project in Medellin, and the national coffee fund. Most
provincial governments also had a print shop and a rum brewery. There were some
privatizations in the banking sector in the mid- 1  980s as a result of government intervention in
an earlier banking crisis. But there was not a systematic attempt to divest state-owned
enterprises  (Zuleta  1993). Lack of privatization warrants the use of the time-invariant  dummy
variable Si to identify state-owned  enterprises in equations  (4) to (7).
The total number of observations used in the analysis is 79,149. Among them,  12,761
correspond to enterprises appearing only once in the data.  However, multiple observations  of
the same plant are common. The average number of times that an enterprise appears in the data
is 9.5, and the median is 10. In a study covering the first nine years of the panel (1977 to 1985),
Roberts (1996) found that the overall patterns of entry and exit were similar to those of
industrialized countries. Most of the observations in the data set are located in the major
metropolitan areas of Bogota, Cali, and Medellin. Enterprises  are relatively  small, as two-thirds
of them employ less than 50 workers and only 8 percent have more than 200 workers. The
distribution of observations by region,  size, and number of appearances  can be found in Table
1.
The characteristics  of state-owned  enterprises differ markedly  from the overall sample.
The corresponding number of observations is 494, of which 78 are from enterprises appearing
only once in the data set. State-owned enterprises  are located in more disperse areas of the
country, with only one-third in the three major metropolitan areas. They are also much larger
than private firms, with more than half of them employing 200 workers or more.
The distribution of observations by sector is shown in Table 2. State-owned enterprises
are clustered in a few major activities: beverages, printing and publishing, food, petroleum
derivatives,  and transportation.  Private enterprises  are fairly evenly distributed across all
sectors, with slightly heavier concentrations  in food and clothing and shoes. On average, value
added per worker is higher for state-owned  enterprises, and value added per unit of capital is
lower, but there are important differences by sector. Some of the sectors in which state-owned
enterprises exist are among the more capital intensive and more concentrated.  Beverages and
petroleum derivatives are also industries where the state has a high proportion of market share.
10Table 1. Sample Characteristics
All enterprises  State-owned enterprises
Geographic  Location  (percent)  (percent)
Bogota D.E., Soacha  34.15  13.56
Cali, Yumbo  11.05  9.72
Medellin, Valle de Aburra  21.40  9.11
Manizales,  Villamaria  1.60  4.66
Barranquilla,  Soledad  6.79  1.82
Bucaramanga,  Gir6n, Floridablanca  5.57  3.04
Pereira,  Santa Rosa de Cabal,  Dosquebra  2.74
Cartegena  1.58  5.06
Rest of the country  15.13  53.04
Total  100.00  100.00
Plant  size  (percent)  (percent)
Less than 20 workers  33.33  7.69
Between 20 and 50 workers  33.40  18.42
Between 50 and 100 workers  15.76  11.54
Between 100 and 200 workers  9.09  10.53
More than 200 workers  8.42  51.82
Total  100.00  100.00
Plants by number of appearances  in data
I year  1,891  18
2 years  3,476  18
3 years  3,837  9
4 years  4,476  16
5 years  5,085  35
6 years  4,818  12
7 years  4,473  63
8 years  4,288  8
9 years  3,987  18
10 years  3,500  20
11  years  3,905  33
12 years  3,156  36
13  years  4,355  26
14 years  27,902  182
Total  79,149  494
Source: Constructed by the authors  using data from the 1977 to  1991 rounds  of the Colombian manufacturing
census.Table 2. Summary Statistics for Enterprises
State-owned enterprises  Private  enterprises
Value  Value  Value  Value
Number  added  added  Number  added  added
of obser-  Workers  per  per  of obser-  Workers  per  per
Sector of activity  vations  perfirm  worker  capital  vations  perfirm  worker  capital
Food  62  133.9  65.1  5.5  13,507  72.2  82.1  11.4
Beverages  219  275.5  320.6  11.4  1,467  193.2  185.5  15.1
Tobacco  200  205.9  146.4  23.9
Textiles  12  35.3  45.7  1.2  5,479  136.0  46.6  16.8
Clothing and shoes  13,055  58.1  38.5  15.6
Leather goods except shoes  1,128  85.2  33.3  17.1
Wood and cork products  1,999  39.4  38.4  10.6
Wood furmiture  2,186  44.1  27.0  13.4
Paper and paper products  1,780  84.3  104.9  17.4
Printing andpublishing  86  73.7  16.0  2.9  4,019  65.6  28.0  7.7
Chemicals  3  23.3  53.6  2.1  5,158  104.7  145.8  24.5
Petroleum derivatives  41  1383.7  196.5  4.8  291  40.2  187.6  13.3
Rubber products  4,404  75.7  50.1  9.7
Nonmetallic minerals  9  29.6  14.6  6.5  4,676  94.3  51.0  144.7
Metals  1,111  172.0  98.7  6.4
Metal products  6,716  58.3  48.2  7.7
Nonelectrical  machinery  1  30.0  433.0  18.8  3,790  52.8  100.3  11.0
Electrical machinery  2,478  94.9  85.7  8.0
Transport equipment  46  242.7  37.6  0.6  2,662  97.9  52.3  8.0
Other manufacturing  15  144.5  503.2  3.2  2,549  56.1  88.1  31.4
All sectors  494  295.2  190.8  7.0  78,655  79.3  67.2  21.3
Source: Constructed by the authors  using data from the  1977 to 1991 rounds of the Colombian  manufacturing
census. Value added per worker is measured in thousands of pesos per year. Value  added per unit of capital  is
measured  as a fraction, over a one-year period.
4.  Downsizing  Episodes
For a reduction in employment to reflect a restructuring  effort, it has to affect a
substantial fraction of the plant's workforce,  and a substantial number of workers, within a
short period. To determine how substantial is substantial  enough, some critical threshold has to
be set. On the other hand, for the reduction to be considered durable, employment has to stay
below its initial level for some time. Again, a critical threshold is needed to determine how far
from the initial level is far enough. Rather than using two independent thresholds, this paper
relies on one critical value, identified in what follows as N. It assumes that a plant experiences
a downsizing episode if employment falls by at least N percent,  and by no less than N workers,
between one year and the next. In addition, employment has to recover by less than N-  I
percent,  and by less than N- I workers, during the following year.
12The dummy variable Dit is thus defined as follows:
D  =I1tifLogLi  -LogLi  - <L  I-L  <- i't  i't1  -I  00  i,t  i,t-
Log L1t± -Log Lit <  1  and  L  - L  < (N -)
i't+1  ~100  i,t+1  '
Di t  = 0  otherwise  (8)
Based on this definition, the number of downsizing episodes should be larger the smaller
is the critical threshold N.
Because the definition of a downsizing episode involves data on employment spanning
three consecutive years, a row of three consecutive  values of Lj  can be treated as an
observation. Figure 2 shows the percentage of all observations that are to be considered
downsizers for different values of N. The figure confirms that this percentage is a downward-
sloping function of N in the case of Colombia, both in the public and in the private sectors. But
the function is not too steep in the private sector, and is remarkably flat in the public sector. In
fact,  all values of N between 6 and  10 yield roughly the same percentage of downsizers among
state-owned  enterprises:  around 6 percent of all observations. The mid-point of this range (N
8) is therefore  used as the critical threshold in what follows.
According to Figure 2, downsizing is more common in the private sector than in the
public sector. Table 3 shows that it also has different features.  On average, public sector
downsizing involves a smaller share of the workforce:  21.1 percent instead of 28.4 percent.
However, state-owned enterprises tend to be larger, so that many more workers are affected in
the public sector (1 10 instead of 36). The characteristics of the affected workers differ too.
Table 4 reveals that females and the unskilled are on average under-represented  among those
who leave the public sector. But they are hugely overrepresented  in the food sector. In the
private sector, by contrast,  there are no major differences between the characteristics  of the
workers affected by downsizing and those who remain in their workforce.
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Source: Constructed by the authors using data from the 1977 to 1991  rounds of the Colombian manufacturing
census.
14Table 3. Downsizing  Episodes
State-owned enterprises  Private  enterprises
Percent  Change  Percent
Percent  Change in  change in  Percent  in  change  in
of obser-  workers  workers  of  obser-  workers  workers
Sector of activity  vations  perfirm  perfirm  vations  perfirm  perfirm
Food  1.6  -10  -36.1  6.0  -39  -32.3
Beverages  5.0  -65  -19.4  11.0  -50  -21.5
Tobacco  12.5  -51  -20.1
Textiles  16.7  -20  -54.8  9.9  -56  -27.4
Clothing and shoes  7.8  -28  -29.5
Leather goods except shoes  7.8  -32  -27.3
Wood and cork products  4.6  -23  -34.0
Wood furniture  7.8  -23  -29.2
Paper and paper products  8.7  -27  -22.8
Printing and publishing  1.2  -12  -13.4  4.5  -38  -30.2
Chemicals  7.0  -37  -25.3
Petroleum derivatives  12.2  -357  -14.9  5.2  -24  -27.3
Rubber products  6.9  -32  -27.9
Nonmetallic minerals  7.3  -30  -27.1
Metals  7.1  -69  -28.6
Metal products  7.7  -27  -29.1
Nonelectrical  machinery  6.6  -24  -29.4
Electrical machinery  9.6  -47  -24.5
Transport equipment  19.6  -42  -18.8  9.5  -42  -26.8
Other manufacturing  8.4  -27  -29.6
All sectors  6.0  -110  -21.1  7.4  -36  -28.4
Source: Constructed by the authors  using data from the  1977 to 1991  rounds of the Colombian manufacturing
census. Downsizing episodes are identified based on employment data spanning three consecutive years. A
downsizing episode involves  a decline  in employment by 8 workers or more, and by 8 percent or more,  from
one year to the next. In addition, employment has to increase by less than 7 workers,  and by less than 7
percent, in the following year.
15Table 4. Summary Statistics for Workers
All workers  Workers affected by downsizing
State-owned enterprises  Private enterprises  State-owned enterprises  Private  enterprises
Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent  Percent
of  of  of  of  of  of  of  of  of  of  Of  of
female  skilled  appren-  female  skilled  appren-  female  skilled  appren-  female  skilled  appren-
Sector of activity  workers  workers  tices  workers  workers  tices  workers  workers  tices  workers  workers  tices
Food  11.1  21.2  0.7  33.6  23.3  0.6  52.2  47.8  0.0  34.9  24.8  0.8
Beverages  36.2  31.8  2.4  17.9  38.4  1.8  37.1  36.4  2.8  14.6  44.3  2.6
Textiles  1.9  8.6  0.0  49.5  14.6  0.7  2.4  6.0  0.0  48.7  15  1.2
Printing and publishing  38.8  22.6  0.2  34.3  20.9  0.9  32.1  47.6  2.4  35.8  25.9  1.3
Chemicals  6.6  21.6  0.0  35.4  32.0  0.9  38.9  34.4  1.4
Petroleum derivatives  8.8  12.4  2.2  12.5  21.7  0.4  7.1  1.9  2.9  10.5  19.9  0.0
Nonmetallic minerals  14.8  19.3  0.0  15.1  13.9  0.7  17.4  16  0.7
Nonelectrical  machinery  3.3  10.0  6.7  14.7  17.3  0.9  16.0  21.9  1.3
Transport equipment  0.6  6.4  0.0  14.8  16.6  1.0  0.8  6.3  0.0  15.5  19.8  1.3
Other manufacturing  17.3  39.2  1.4  41.5  18.5  0.6  43.9  21.1  0.7
All  sectors  25.8  24.2  1.4  35.6  18.5  0.8  18.2  19.2  1.7  37.5  20.9  1.0
Source: Constructed by the authors using data from the  1977 to  1991  rounds of the Colombian manufacturing  census.Figures 3 to 5 display the distribution of the productivity gains dy, d(y/l) and d(y/k)
across state-owned and privately owned enterprises.  In each  case, the distinction is made
between downsizers  and nondownsizers.  The most striking difference between these two
groups concerns d(y/l). Figure 4 shows that value added per workers grows substantially
more in downsizers  than in nondownsizers.  If anything, the gap is larger in the public
sector than in the private sector.  The patterns  are slightly different for the other two
productivity indicators. Value added per unit of capital grows faster among downsizers in
the public sector.
Figure 3. Distribution of Annual Changes in Value Added
- Downsizer  o  Non-downsizer
0 
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Panel  (a) State-owned enterprises
- Downsizer  ---o  Non-downsizer
1.5  -
-2  0  2
Chg  in  log real \slue added
Panel (b) Private enterprises
Source: Constructed by the authors using data from the  1977 to 1991  rounds of the Colombian
manufacturing census.  The density functions  were drawn using Epanechnikov  kernels with optimal
width. Changes in value added per worker  are measured in logs.
17Figure 4. Distribution of Annual Changes in Value Added per Worker
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Source: Constructed by the authors using data from the  1977 to 1991  rounds of the Colombian
manufacturing  census. The density functions were drawn using Epanechnikov kernels with optimal
width. Changes  in value added per worker are measured in logs.
18Figure 5. Distribution of Annual Changes in Value  Added per Unit of Capital
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Source: Constructed  by  the  authors  using  data  from  the  1977  to  1991  rounds  of the  Colombian
manufacturing  census.  The  density  functions were  drawn  using Epanechnikov  kernels  with optimal
width Changes in value added per unit of capital are measured  in logs.
195.  Main Results
The determinants of annual changes  in productivity are analyzed in Tables 5 to 7.
Each of these tables focuses on one of the three productivity indicators chosen: annual
change in total value added, annual change in value added per worker, and annual changes
in value added per capital, respectively.  Two sets of regression results are reported for each
indicator.  One of them, in the tables identified with the letter "a,"  corresponds to the
specification in equation (4). The other set, identified with the letter "b," corresponds  to the
specification in equation (5). The latter set relies on smaller samples, but the corresponding
regressions include plant-specific effects. If downsizing episodes are not correlated with
unobservable characteristics  of the enterprises,  the estimates in the "a" tables are
preferable, because of their higher precision. If they are correlated, however,  the estimates
in the "b" tables are more reliable, because they are unbiased.
The sets of regressions in Tables 5 to 7 also differ in the control variables
considered.  The specification in the first column is the most parsimonious.  It only includes
the state-ownership  dummy, the downsizing dummy, and their interaction.  Subsequent
columns control for the initial "size" of the enterprise (in terms of capital stock,
employment level or both), sector, province and year effects. The last two columns take
into account the environment  in which enterprises  operate, measured at the sector level.
The control variables  considered here refer to the degree of competition in product markets
and the tax burden.
The extent of product market competition is captured by the Herfindahl index, which
is a standard measure of industry concentration.  The index is higher the more concentrated
the industry. In the Colombian data set, it varies from 0.79 to 69.43, with an average of
4.38. Another measure of product market competition is the export orientation of the
sector, which is computed as the ratio of total exports to total output. The more export-
oriented is a sector, the stronger the competitive pressures it faces. In the Colombian data
set, the export orientation variable ranges from zero to 0.242, with an average of 0.027.
Unfortunately, data on exports were missing for many observations,  thus reducing the
sample size substantially. This is why the export  orientation variable was only used in the
last column of Tables 5 to 7.
A similar problem arises with the tax burden. The ideal measure in this respect is the
average tax rate at the sector level, computed as the difference between taxes and subsidies
divided by value added.  But again, information on subsidies was missing for a large
number of observations. Hence the construction of two separate variables, one for taxes
and one for subsidies, with the latter only entering the regressions in the last column of
Tables 5 to 7. In the Colombian data set, the average tax rate is 18.1 percent,  and the
average subsidy rate 2.5 percent.
20Tables  5a and 5b show that downsizing is associated with a large drop in value added
in private enterprises.  This drop is estimated at roughly  15 to 20 percentage points,
regardless of the econometric method and the set of control variables used.  However, there
is a very significant  difference between private enterprises and state-owned enterprises.
The coefficient multiplying the interaction term between downsizing and state ownership
( a3 in equation 4, or  f 3 in equation 5) is indeed positive, and close to 30 percent. This
means that value added actually grows in state-owned enterprises that downsize. Tables 5a
and 5b also reveal interesting information regarding other determinants of annual growth
in value added. Other things equal, productivity growth is lower in state-owned enterprises
and in more concentrated industries.  It is slightly higher in large enterprises.
Table 5a. Determinants of Annual Changes in Value Added OLS Estimates
Dependent variable: Change in the log of  value added
State-owned  -0.083***  -0.127***  -0.067***  4.099***  -0.099***  -0.096***
enterprise  (-3.46)  (-5.30)  (-2.75)  (-4.08)  (-4.11)  (-3.56)
Downsizing  -0.191***  -0.211***  -0.180***  -0.200***  -0.200***  -0.198***
episode  (-27.10)  (-29.84)  (-25.85)  (-28.65)  (-28.64)  (-25.22)
State owned x  0.266***  0.265***  0.267***  0.264***  0.260***  0.206***
downsizing  (2.73)  (2.73)  (2.78)  (2.77)  (2.74)  (2.04)
Log of initial  0.006***  0.006***  0.006***  0.006***
capital stock  (4.11)  (4.50)  (4.47)  (3.78)
Log of initial  0.022***  0.023***  0.023***  0.026***
employment  (8.90)  (9.04)  (9.04)  (9.00)
Sector Herfindahl  -0.004***  0-004***
(-4.16)  (-3.30)
Sector export  0.059
orientation  (0.25)
Sector tax rate  -0.0001  -0.027
(-1.60)  (-1.36)
Sector  subsidy  0.003
rate  (0.14)
Sector durmmies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Province  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
dummies
Year dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R2 0.009  0.013  0.045  0.050  0.050  0.054
F-test  247.6  213.9  88.3  92.3  88.8  79.4
Number of
observations  79,149  78,717  79,149  78,717  78,717  63,246
Source: Constructed by the authors using data from the 1977 to  1991 rounds of the Colombian manufacturing
census. All regressions  were estimated by ordinary least-squares; t-values are reported in parentheses.
Significant coefficients at the  10, 5,  and 1 percent level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks,
respectively.
21Table 5b. Determinants of Annual Changes in Value  Added Fixed Effects  Estimates
Dependent  variable:Change  in the log of value added
Downsizing  -0.160***  -0.152***  4  154***  -0.146***  0.146***  4.142***
episode  (-20.55)  (-19.54)  (-20.17)  (-19.23)  (-19.20)  (-16.50)
State owned x  0.305***  0.314***  0.292***  0.299***  0.295***  0.243***
downsizing  (2.86)  (2.98)  (2.80)  (2.90)  (2.86)  (2.16)
Log of initial  o.o19***  0.015***  0.014***  0.015***
capital stock  (6.30)  (5.02)  (4.74)  (4.37)
Log of initial  0.172***  0.162***  0.163***  0.176***
employment  (24.60)  (23.59)  (23.63)  (21.86)
Sector  -0.007***  -0.006***
Herfindahl  (-7.05)  (-5.74)
Sector export  0.210
orientation  (0.89)
Sector tax rate  -0.0003**  -0.052***
(-2.90)  (-2.51)
Sector subsidy  0.022
rate  (0.93)
Sector  No  No  No  No  No  No
dummies
Province  No  No  No  No  No  No
dummies
Year dunmmies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Within R2 0.006  0.018  0.051  0.061  0.020  0.057
F-test  212.1  305.2  305.2  251.9  228.4  174.3
Number of
observations  77,258  76,831  77,258  76,831  76,831  61,587
Source: Constructed by the authors using data from the  1977 to  1991 rounds of the Colombian manufacturing
census. All regressions  were estimated using fixed effects estimators; t-values are reported in parentheses.
Significant coefficients at the 10,  5, and  1 percent level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks,
respectively.
Downsizing is also associated with a substantial increase in value added per worker.
In Tables 6a and 6b the coefficient multiplying the downsizing dummy fluctuates in the
range of 20 to 25 percentage  points. Again, the result is basically independent of the
econometric  method used, and the set of control variables considered.  But this time the
difference between private enterprises  and state-owned enterprises  is statistically
insignificant.  Also, the results in Tables 6a and 6b support the view that productivity
growth is lower in the public sector and in more concentrated industries. The significance
of the coefficients on the export orientation and taxation variables depends on the
econometric method and the specification chosen. Based on the fixed effects results, a
heavy tax burden could be associated with a lower growth rate of value added per worker.
22Table 6a. Determinants of Annual Changes in Value  Added per Worker OLS
Estimates
Dependent variable:Change  in the log of value added  per worker
State-owned  -0.062***  -0.074***  -0.048***  -0.057***  -0.057***  -0.042
enterprise  (-2.56)  (-3.06)  (-1.94)  (-2.31)  (-2.34)  (-1.54)
Downsizing  0.217***  0.210***  0.227***  0.220***  0.220***  0.221***
episode  (30.74)  (29.65)  (32.35)  (31.24)  (31.24)  (28.00)
State owned x  0.088  0.090  0.090  0.091  0.088  0.005
downsizing  (0.91)  (0.92)  (0.94)  (0.95)  (0.92)  (0.05)
Log of initial  0.004***  0.004***  0.005***  0.006***
capital stock  (4.70)  (4.79)  (4.75)  (5.07)
Sector Herfindahl  _0.004***  -0.003***
(-3.23)  (-2.13)
Sector export  -0.469***
orientation  (-1.96)
Sector tax rate  -0.000  -0.013
(-0.06)  (-0.65)
Sector subsidy rate  0.010
(0.44)
Sector dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Province dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R2 0.012  0.012  0.044  0.044  0.044  0.048
F-test  320.4  242.1  85.6  83.7  80.3  71.3
Number of
observations  79,138  78,706  79,138  78,706  78,706  63,239
Source: Constructed by the authors using data from the 1977 to 1991 rounds of the Colombian  manufacturing
census.  All regressions  were estimated by ordinary least-squares; t-values are reported in parentheses.
Significant coefficients at the 10,  5, and  I percent level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks,
respectively.
As regards value added per unit of capital, it does decline in private enterprises that
downsize. In Tables 7a and 7b, the point estimate for this decline is around  10 to  15
percentage points, regardless of the econometric  method and control variables used. State-
owned enterprises, however, could experience an increase in value added per unit of
capital as a result of downsizing. The coefficient on the interactive term has roughly the
same size (20 to 25 percentage  points) in all specifications,  and is statistically significant in
most of them. Almost all of the other potential determinants of productivity growth appear
to be irrelevant.  The only exception is the initial size of the enterprise, which shows a
positive association with the annual change in value added per unit of capital.
23Table 6b. Determinants of Annual Changes in Value Added per Worker Fixed Effects
Estimates
Dependent variable:  Change in the log of value added  per worker
Downsizing episode  0.252***  0.246***  0.260***  0.255***  0.255***  0.256***
(31.86)  (31.22)  (33.32)  (32.76)  (32.80)  (29.05)
Stateownedx  0.123  0.131  0.105  0.111  0.107  0.038
downsizing  (1.14)  (1.21)  (0.99)  (1.05)  (1.01)  (0.33)
Log of initial capital  0.024***  0.022***  0.021***  0.021***
stock  (8.08)  (7.31)  (7.06)  (6.19)
Sector Herfindahl  -0.006***  4-.005***
(-5.94)  (-4.68)
Sector export  0.007
orientation  (0.03)
Sector tax rate  0.0001  -0.046**
(-1.10)  (-2.18)
Sector subsidy rate  0.018
(0.73)
Sector dummies  No  No  No  No  No  No
Province dummies  No  No  No  No  No  No
Year dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Within R  2 0.015  0.016  0.050  0.050  0.039  0.051
F-test  513.5  356.4  230.2  216.7  194.7  164.1
Number of
observations  77,243  76,816  77,243  76,816  76,816  61,577
Source: Constructed  by the authors using data from the 1977 to 1991  rounds of the Colombian manufacturing
census. All regressions  were estimated using fixed effects estimators; t-values are reported in parentheses.
Significant coefficients at the 10, 5, and  1 percent level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks,
respectively.
To summarize, downsizing  episodes in the private sector are associated with a
decline in total value added, an increase in value added per worker and a decline in value
added per unit of capital. Downsizing episodes in the public sector, on the other hand, are
associated with an increase in all three productivity indicators.
The differences between the outcomes in the two sectors could be partly due to the
fact that downsizing entails larger employment cuts, in relative terms, in the private sector
(see Table 2). Political considerations  could make mass layoffs more difficult in the public
sector.  More drastic labor restructuring  in the private sector could account for both the
decline in total value added and the increase in value added per worker.  But differences
between the two sectors would also be consistent with a higher level of initial inefficiency
in the state-owned  enterprises (see Figure 1). In particular,  outdated work practices and
poor monitoring could be kept for much longer than in the private sector. Public sector
downsizing could therefore be associated with a move towards the technology frontier, and
not just with a move along that frontier.
24Table 7a. Determinants of Annual Changes  in Value Added per Unit of Capital OLS
Estimates
Dependent variable:Change  in the log of  value added  per unit of capital
State-owned enterprise  -0.040  -0.036  -0.037  -0.035  -0.035  -0.65**
(-1.22)  (-1.10)  (-I.1I1)  (-1.03)  (-1.02)  (-1.71)
Downsizing episode  -0.127***  -0.126***  -0.123***  (-  -0.121***  -0.121***  -0.125***
(-13.19)  (-12.88)  12.71)  (-12.43)  (-12.43)  (-11.34)
State owned x  0.279***  0.280***  0.263***  0.263***  0.264***  0.225
downsizing  (2.09)  (2.09)  (1.98)  (1.99)  (2.00)  (1.59)
Log of initial  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002
employment  (-1.26)  (-1.25)  (-1.24)  (-0.72)
Sector Herfindahl  0.0003  -0.0006
(0.24)  (-0.38)
Sector export  -0.082
orientation  (-0.02)
Sector tax rate  -0.0001  0.0001
(-1.04)  (0.01)
Sector subsidy rate  0.028
(0.88)
Sector dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Province dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Year dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R2 0.002  0.002  0.024  0.024  0.024  0.028
F-test  58.6  44.4  45.6  44.6  42.7  40.8
Number of
observations  78,657  78,657  78,657  78,657  78,657  63,206
Source: Constructed  by the authors  using data from the  1977 to 1991 rounds of the Colombian manufacturing
census.  All regressions were  estimated by ordinary least-squares;  t-values  are reported in parentheses.
Significant coefficients at the  10,  5, and  1 percent level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks,
respectively.
25Table 7b. Determinants of Annual Changes in Value Added per Unit of Capital Fixed
Effects Estimates
Dependent variable:  Change in the log of value added  per  unit of capital
-0.1I  10  -0.102***  -0.105***  -0.099***  -0.099***  -0.106***
Downsizing episode  (-10.15)  (-9.47)  (-9.77)  (-9.15)  (-9.15)  (-8.64)
State owned x  0.253**  0.254**  0.227  0.228  0.228  0.202
downsizing  (1.71)  (1.72)  (1.56)  (1.56)  (1.56)  (1.26)
Log of initial  0.088***  0.086***  0.086***  0.088***
employment  (9.21)  (9.09)  (9.12)  (7.81)
0.0004  0.0002
Sector Herfindahl  (0.33)  (0.16)
Sector export  -0.106
orientation  (-0.32)
-0.0002  0.020
Sector tax rate  (-1.66)  (0.67)
0.036
Sector  subsidy rate  (1.06)
Sector dummies  No  No  No  No  No  No
Province dummies  No  No  No  No  No  No
Year dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Within R 2 0.002  0.003  0.026  0.028  0.028  0.031
F-test  52.0  62.9  118.7  116.6  103.8  96.7
Number of
observations  76,773  76,773  76,773  76,773  76,773  61,545
Source: Constructed by the authors using data from the 1977 to 1991 rounds of the Colombian manufacturing
census. All regressions were estimated using fixed effects  estimators; t-values  are reported in parentheses.
Significant coefficients at the  10, 5, and 1  percent level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks,
respectively.
6.  Does Market Structure Matter?
Initial efficiency could be lower in state-owned enterprises if the latter were
sheltered from product market competition in one way or another. From this perspective,
the potential productivity  gains from downsizing could be higher in activities that are
highly concentrated,  or not exposed to export markets. In terms of the analytical section
above, this difference between state-owned and privately owned enterprises  should be
reflected in coefficients  a 6  in equation (6), and  '86 in equation (7). These are the
coefficients  multiplying the interactive terms on ownership (Si), downsizing (Dit) and
market structure (Mjt). If these coefficients were statistically different from zero, public
sector downsizing would be more conducive to higher productivity in some market
environments  than in others.
26However,  exposure to competitive  forces could also have an impact on productivity
gains in "normal" periods. In the absence of major restructuring endeavors,  state-owned
enterprises could be unable to keep pace with private enterprises in highly competitive
markets. Political pressures and insider power could make the public sector particularly ill-
suited to activities requiring a rapid adjustment to changing demand.  As a result,
productivity growth in nondownsizing years could be slower than in the private sector. In
analytical terms,  coefficients  a4 and  14 would be different from zero.  These are the
coefficients multiplying the interactive terms on ownership  (Si) and market structure (Mot).
The regressions  in Tables 8 and 9 aim at testing the hypothesis that market structure
matters.  These Tables report estimates for the key coefficients  in equations  (6) and (7), for
two indicators of product market competition.  In the regressions in Table 8,  Mit is
measured by the Herfindahl index at the sector level. In the regressions in Table 9, it is
measured by the export orientation index, also defined at the sector level. All other control
variables are the same as in the last columns of Tables 5, 6 and 7. This means that only two
regression results are reported for each of the productivity indicators: one relying on
ordinary least squares and using the maximum number of observations, the other one
relying on fixed effects estimators and focusing on plants that are observed at least twice in
the data set.
The results in these tables suggest that the productivity gains from public sector
downsizing do not depend on the extent of competition in product markets. None of the
estimates for coefficients  a6 or  86  is statistically different from zero, regardless of the
product market indicator used.
However, productivity gains  in nondownsizing years do depend on the extent of
product market competition.  Coefficients  a 6 and  86  are significantly negative when the
extent of competition is measured by the export orientation of the activity. State-owned
enterprises exhibit much lower productivity gains than their private sector counterparts  in
activities that are exposed to world markets. The results are more mixed when the extent of
competition is measured by the Herfindahl index, as the sign of coefficients  a6 and / 6
depends on the econometric  technique used. The fixed effects estimates should be more
reliable,  as they are not affected by selection bias. Based on these estimates,  state-owned
enterprises exhibit higher productivity gains than their private sector counterparts in
concentrated  markets.
The regression analyses in Tables 8 and 9 could probably be refined. In the
meantime, the results should be treated with caution. Those results tentatively suggest that
state-owned enterprises perform poorly in highly competitive markets. But trying to
improve their performance by restricting competition could reduce the overall efficiency of
the economy, and adversely affect the well-being of the population. On the other hand, the
27results in Tables 8  and 9 also suggest that the basic differences between public sector
downsizing and private sector downsizing that were identified  in the previous section stand
for enterprises operating in both competitive and uncompetitive  market structures.
Table 8. Industry Concentration and Productivity Gains from Downsizing
Dependent variable. Change in the log of value added
Total  per worker  per unit of capital
OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE
State-owned  -0.040  0.005  -0.003
enterprise  (-1.18)  (0.16)  (-0.07)
Downsizing  -0.210***  -0.159***  0.219***  0.251***  -0.128***  -0.114***
episode  (-20.16)  (-13.80)  (20.86)  (21.35)  (-8.75)  (-6.94)
State owned x  0.778  0.169  -0.128  -0.037  0.026  0.015
downsizing  (0.55)  (1.07)  (-0.89)  (-0.23)  (0.13)  (0.07)
Sector  -0.004***  -0.007***  -0.002*  -0.006***  -0.000  -0.000
Herfindahl  (-3.17)  (-6.34)  (-1.93)  (-5.12)  (-0.22)  (-0.08)
Downsizing x  0.003*  0.004**  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002
Herfindahl  (1.85)  (2.17)  (0.21)  (0.61)  (0.36)  (0.71)
State owned x  -0.007***  0.016***  -0.006**  0.015**  -0.008**  0.006
Herfindahl  (-2.79)  (2.72)  (-2.33)  (2.50)  (-2.18)  (0.78)
State owned x
downsizing x  0.010  0.003  0.011  0.005  0.016  0.012




Table  5a  5b  6a  6b  7a  7b
Adjusted R2 /
Within R2 0.054  0.057  0.048  0.051  0.028  0.031
F-test  74.8  150.0  67.0  139.9  38.4  82.3
Number of
observations  63,246  61,587  63,239  61,577  63,206  61,545
Source: Constructed by the authors using data from the 1977 to  1991 rounds of the Colombian
manufacturing census. Regressions  in the first, third and fifth columns were estimated using
ordinary least squares.  Those in the second, fourth and sixth column  were estimated using fixed
effects. t-values are reported in parentheses.  Significant coefficients at the  10, 5,  and  1 percent level
are indicated by one, two and three asterisks, respectively.
28Table 9. Export Orientation and Productivity Gains from Downsizing
Dependent variable: Change in the log of value added
Total  per worker  per unit of capital
OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE
State-owned enterprise  0.030  0.070*  0.012
(0.77)  (1.80)  (0.21)
Downsizing episode  -0.200***  -0.156***  0.194***  0.225***  -0.129***  0.112***
(-15.48)  (-10.97)  (14.91)  (15.42)  (-7.09)  (-5.50)
State owned x downsizing  0.104  0.145  -0.068  -0.033  0.034  0.004
(0.67)  (0.86)  (-0.44)  (-0.19)  (0.16)  (0.02)
Sector export orientation  0.082  0.270  -0.457*  0.041  -0.069  -0.036
(0.34)  (1.14)  (-1.91)  (0.17)  (-0.21)  (-0.11)
Downsizing x export  0.109  0.541  1.043***  1.243***  0.164  0.214
(0.27)  (1.21)  (2.57)  (2.72)  (0.29)  (0.34)
State ownedx export  -7.710***  -28.46***  -6.925***  -28.56***  -4.721**  -27.76***
(-4.55)  (-6.87)  (-4.06)  (-6.73)  (-1.99)  (-4.70)
State  owned  x downsizing  6.147  -1.403  5.000  -2.805  12.601  5.563
x export  (0.77)  (-0.16)  (0.62)  (-0.32)  (1.13)  (0.45)
Other control variables as
in last column of Table  5a  5b  6a  6b  7a  7b
Adjusted R2 0.054  0.058  0.048  0.052  0.028  0.031
F-test  74.9  151.8  67.3  142.3  38.4  83.3
Number of observations  63,246  61,587  63,239  61,577  63,206  61,545
Source: Constructed by the authors using data  from the 1977 to 1991  rounds of the Colombian manufacturing
census. Regressions in the first, third and fifth columns were estimated using ordinary least squares. Those in
the second, fourth and sixth column were estimated using fixed effects.  t-values  are reported in parentheses.
Significant coefficients  at the  10, 5,  and I percent level are indicated by one, two and three asterisks,
respectively.
7.  Conclusions
This paper uses a unique data set to assess the productivity impact of public sector
downsizing in a developing country. The restructuring of  public sector enterprises  has been
one of the main areas of policy activism in developing countries  and transition economies
in recent years. And it is bound to remain important in the near future.  While privatization
could be preferable, it might not be a viable option, both for economic and political
reasons. Unfortunately, very little is known about the actual impact of downsizing on the
productivity of state-owned enterprises.  To our knowledge,  our paper is the first one to
address this issue based on an empirical  analysis, and not on simulations.
The results of this empirical analysis suggest that the productivity gains from
downsizing may be larger in state-owned enterprises than in private enterprises. While the
increase in value added per worker is similar in both cases, state-owned enterprises
29experience an increase in total value added,  and in value added per unit of capital, whereas
both indicators decline  in private enterprises.  But the difference could be simply due to the
larger extent of initial inefficiency in state-owned enterprises.  Quite unexpectedly,  this
difference does not appear to depend on the degree of competition in product markets.
Several important caveats apply.  To begin with, our results refer to downsizing in a
specific developing country over a specific period of time,  and may not be replicable
elsewhere.  The results indicate that public sector downsizing did increase productivity
substantially in that country and period; not that it will always increase productivity. If
anything, the experience of Colombia implies that appropriate instruments to process mass
job separations  should be made available to the state-owned enterprises that need to
restructure their operations.  Not that public sector downsizing should become a goal of
economic policy.
Caution should also be exercised when assessing the implications of our results for
privatization. The results in this paper suggest that enterprise restructuring, including labor
downsizing,  can serve a useful purpose in preparation to privatization.  The magnitude of
the productivity gains observed in Colombia could be large enough to make state-owned
enterprises profitable, hence attractive to prospective bidders. But it is not clear that the
productivity gains would be large enough to justify the operation, from an economic point
of view. The resulting increase in privatization price could not be large enough to
compensate the costs associated with downsizing,  and in particular with mass job
separations.
Moreover, the paper shows that in "normal" years, productivity gains are larger in
private enterprises than in state-owned enterprises.  It also appears that state-owned
enterprises are particularly ill-suited to operate in a highly competitive environment,
characterized  by low concentration or substantial exposure to world markets. Even if
public sector downsizing can improve the performance of state-owned enterprises  in the
short run, in the long run private enterprises seem to do better. From this perspective,
public sector restructuring, including labor downsizing, would only be a second best when
privatization is a viable option.
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